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492 CAL-DAK Co. v. SAv-ON DRuGs, INc. [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22168. In Bank. Mar. 17, 1953.] 
'fHE CAL-DAK COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
SA V-ON DRUGS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Monopolies-Fair 'frade Laws-Acts Violating.-Acts of de-
fendant retailer in offering clothes baskets for sale at prices 
below price fixed by plaintiff manufacturer in agreements 
with its jobbers constitute a violation of the Fair Trade Act. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.) 
[2] !d.-Fair Trade Laws-Violation as Unfair Competition.-
Violation under Fair Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 
et seq.) of a contract relating to the resale of a commodity 
which bears a trademark is unfair competition and action-
able even though the violator is not a party to the contract 
and did not sign it. 
[3] !d.-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief.-Since 1952 amend-
ment of Miller-Tydings Amendment to Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act exempts from latter statute state laws giving validity 
to price fixing contracts and making them binding on non-
signers, a preliminary injunction against a retailer violating 
our Fair Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.) may 
be granted regardless of whether or not interstate commerce 
is involved. 
[ 4] Injunctions-Preliminary Injunction.-A preliminary injunc-
tion is aimed at preventing conduct after issuance of the in-
junction and likely to occur during pendency of the action. 
[5] Appeal-Review-Matters After Judgment or Order Appealed 
from.-Relief by injunction operates in futuro, and on an 
appeal involving such relief the right thereto must be deter-
mined as of the date of decision by the appellate court. 
[6] Monopolies-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief-AppeaL-
Where trial court in action by manufacturer seeking injunc-
tive relief and damages against retailer for violation of Fair 
Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.) has not 
passed on question of whether defendant threatened to con-
tinue its acts during pendency of action, the appropriate pro-
[1] Right of manufacturer, producer or wholesaler to control 
retail price, notes, 7 A.L.R. 449 ; 19 A.L.R. 925; 32 A.L.R. 1087; 
103 A.L.R. 1331; 104 A.L.R. 1452; 106 A.L.R. 1486; 110 A.L.R. 
1413; 125 A.L.R. 1335. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1948 
Rev.), Monopolies and Combinations, § 10; Am.Jur., Monopolies, 
Combinations and Restraints on Trade, § 28. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6, 7] Monopolies, § 14; [4] In-
junctions, §50; [5] Appeal and Error, § 972. 
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cedure, on appeal from an order denying a preliminary in-
junction, is to remand the case to the trial court for such 
proceedings as are proper in the light of the 1952 change 
in the Miller-Tydings Amendment to Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. 
[7] Id.-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief and Damages-Ap-
peaL-On appeal from an order denying a preliminary in-
junction in action by manufacturer for injunctive relief and 
damages against retailer for violation of Fair Trade Act (Bus. 
& Prof. Code,§ 1G900 et seq.), the question of damages claimed 
hy plaintiff by reason of defendant's alleged improper con-
duct prior to 1952 change in the lVIiller-Tydings Amendment 
to Sherman Anti-Trust Act is not before the court for con-
sideration, and inasmuch as the issue of whether interstate 
commerce was involved at such time is a mixed factual and 
legal question, it would be more appropriate to determine this 
issue on the trial of the action rather than on bare allega-
tions in the pleadings. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County denying application for a preliminary in-
junction. l<'rank G. Swain, ,Tudge. Reversed with directions. 
Landels & vVeigel, 0 'Connor & 0 'Connor and Stanley A. 
Weigel for Appellant. 
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright and Her-
schel B. Green for Respondent. 
CAllTEH, .J.-Plaintiff' appeals from an order denying its 
application for a preliminary injunction in an action seeking 
injunc·i:ive relief and damages. 
Plaintiff is a Califoruia corporation engaged in the manu-
faeture and sale o£ clothes baskets under the trade name 
"Sav-Ur-Bak Clothes Basket." Defendant is a California 
corporation engaged in this state in the operation of retail 
drugstores. Defendant bought some of the clothes baskets 
from plaintiff's jobber in this state and has offered them for 
sale at retail in its stores at prices below the retail price fixed 
by plaintifi in agreements with its jobbers. Plaintiff com-
menced this action asking for an injunction and alleged that 
it had suffered damages because of defendant's conduct. Its 
application for a preliminary injunction was denied. 
[1] It is clear according to plaintiff's complaint that de-
fendant's acts in offering the baskets for sale below the price 
fixed is a violation of the Pair 'frade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
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§ 16900 et seq.) for thereunder a contract relating to the re-
sale of a commodity which bears a trademark may provide 
that the buyer will not resell except at the price stipulated 
by the vendor.* [2] And the violation of the contract IS 
unfair competition and actionable even though the violator IS 
not a party to the contract-did not sign it. 1 Defendant 1s 
not a party to the contract between plaintiff and its jobber. 
Defendant, however, invokes the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
(15 U.S.O.A., § 1) as invalidating such contracts and urges 
that the Miller-'l'ydings Amendment to that act2 purporting 
*"(a) No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity 
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, 
brand, or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which 
is in fair and open competition with commodities of the same general 
class produced by others violates any law of this State by reason of any 
of the following provisions which may be contained in such contract: 
"(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price 
stipulated by the vendor. 
'' (2) That the vendee or producer require the person to whom he may 
resell such commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at 
the price stipulated by such vendor or by such vendee. 
"(b) Such provisions in any contract imply conditions that such 
commodity may be resold without reference to such agreement in the 
following cases: 
"(1) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing 
delivering any such commodity. 
"(2) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and 
notice is given to the public thereof. 
" ( 3) By any officer acting under the orders of any court." (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 16902.) 
1
" Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any 
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into 
pursuant to this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for 
sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition 
and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.'' (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 16904.) 
2
' 'Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall 
render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for 
the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which 
bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of 
such commodity and which is in free and open competition with com-
modities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, 
when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied 
to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now 
or hereafter in effect in any State, 'rerritory, or the District of Columbia 
in which such resale is to be made. or to which the commoditv is to he 
transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts. or agree-
ments shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 4;'i of 
this title: Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not make 
lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or 
maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, 
between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or 
between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between 
persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other." (15 
U.S.C.A., § 1.) 
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to exempt such contracts from the Sherman Act does not ex-
tend to nonsigners as interpreted by the United States Su-
preme Court in Schwegm.ann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
341 LT.S. 384 [71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, 19 A.L.R.2d 1119]. 
It vvas held in that case that where interstate commerce is in-
volved such contracts violate the Sherman Act and that the 
Miller-Tydings amendment thereto, while exempting the 
parties to the contract from the Sherman Act, does not extend 
to nonsigners of the contract. Hence the state Fair Trade 
Act embracing nonsigners can have no application where 
interstate commerce is involved. The sole issue presented on 
the application for a preliminary injunction was, therefore, 
whether interstate commerce was involved, thus making the 
federal statutes applicable. 
On this question, as above shown, the baskets were manu-
factured in California by plaintiff, a California corporation, 
and were sold by plaintiff to its jobber in this state and its 
jobber sold and delivered them to defendant, who offers them 
for retail sale, all in this state. There are additional factors, 
however, as appears from defendant's answer where it is 
alleged: " ... plaintiff's said clothes baskets are sold by 
jobbers throughout the United States. That said jobbers own 
and operate their establishments within and without the State 
of California. That a great majority of plaintiff's said clothes 
baskets are sold to Jewel Tea Company in Chicago, Illinois. 
'l'hat the said Jewel Tea Company sells plaintiff's said clothes 
baskets throughout the United States. That plaintiff main-
tains an office and is conducting business in the City of 
Chicago, State of Illinois. That in the purchase of materials 
used by plaintiff in the manufacture of its clothes baskets 
outside the State of California, the shipment by plaintiff of 
its said clothes baskets to its office and place of business in 
Chicago, Illinois, the shipment by plaintiff of said clothes 
baskets to jobbers in Illinois and in other states and in the 
transaction of business in its Chicago office, plaintiff has been 
since 1937 and is now continuously engaged in interstate com-
merce.'' 
The application for a preliminary injunction was denied 
on August 10, 1951. This appeal was taken from the order 
of denial. Thereafter Congress amended (approved July 19, 
1952) the Miller-Tydings. amendment to the Sherman Act to 
exempt from the latter, state laws such as ours giving validity 
to price fixing contracts and making them binding on non-
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signers; it in effect nullifies the Schwegmann case.* [3] It is 
not disputed that under the 1952 law nonsigners are bound by 
our state Fair Trade Act, snpm, and thus thereunder a prelimi-
nary injunction could have been properly granted regardless 
of whether or not interstate commerce is involved. [ 4] This 
is true because a preliminary injunction (here we have an 
order denying such an injunction) is aimed at preventing 
future condlict-conduct after the issuance of the injunction 
and likely to occur during the pendency of the action. [5] "Re-
lief by injunction operates in futuro, and the right to it must 
<·''That it is the purpose of this Act to protect the rights of States 
under the United States Constitution to regulate their internal affairs 
and more particularly to enact statutes and laws, and to adopt policies, 
which authorize eontraets and agreements prescribing minimum or stipu-
lateu prices for the resale of commodities and to extend the rninimum or· 
stip~~lated prices prescribed by such contracts and agreernents to persons 
who are not parties thereto. It is the further purpose of this Act to 
permit sueh statutes, laws, and public policies to apply to commodities, 
contracts, agreements, and activities in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . 
"(2) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts 
shall render unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum 
or stipulated prices, or requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or 
agreements prescribh1g minimum or stipulated prices, for the resale of a 
commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the 
trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such com-
modity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of 
the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts 
or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate 
transactions under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in 
effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such 
resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for 
such resale. 
" ( 3) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts 
shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or 
right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or here-
after in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, 
which in substance provides that willfully and knowmgly advertising, 
offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or 
prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the peTson so 
advertising, offeTing for sale, or selling is OT is not a party to such a 
contract or ag1·eement, is tmfair competition and is actionable at the suit 
of any person damaged thereby. 
" '(4) Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in 
paragraph (2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of any 
right or right of action as described in paragraph (3) of this sub-
section shall constitute an unlawful buruen or restraint upon, or interfer-
ence with, commerce. 
" '(5) Nothing contamed in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall 
make lawful contracts or agreements providing for the establishment 
or maintenance of minimum or stipulated res::tle prices on any commodity 
referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection, between manufacturers, 
or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or 
between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or cor-
porations in competition with each other.' " (Emphasis added.) (Pub. 
Law 542, 82d Congress, ch. 745, 2d sess.) 
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be determined as of the date of decision by an appellate 
court." (American Fntit Growers v. Parker, 22 Oal.2d 513, 515 
[140 P.2d 23]; also Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746,754 [155 
P.2d 3431; Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 82 CaLApp.2d 
45 [185 P.2d 393] ; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore 
Irr. Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489 [42 P.2d 972]; Brophy v. Employers 
Retirement System, 71 Cal.App.2d 455 [162 P.2d 939]; 
Diederichsen v. Sutch, 47 Cal.App.2d 646 [118 P.2d 863] .) 
Defendant asserts, however, that it does not intend to do 
the acts charged during the pendency of the action and there 
is nothing to show it does; hence a preliminary injunction is 
not proper. The application for the injunction was made and 
decided upon the verified pleadings of the parties and while 
plaintiff alleged that defendant threatened to and would con-
tinue his improper conduct, that was denied by defendant 
and the parties rested their cases and the trial court based 
its denial of the injunction solely on the ground that, as inter-
state commerce was involved, no injunction would lie in any 
event under the Sherman Act, the Miller-Tydings amendment 
and the Schwegmann case, which as we have seen is no longer 
the crucial issue. [6] The trial court has never passed on the 
question of whether defendant threatened to continue its acts 
during the pendency of the action. Hence the appropriate pro-
cedure is to reverse the order denying the preliminary injunc-
tion and remand the case to the trial court for such proceedings 
as are proper in the light of the 1952 change in the law. 
[7] There still remains in the case the question of the 
damages claimed by plaintiff by reason of defendant's alleged 
improper conduct prior to the 1952 change in the law, which, 
as above noted, requires the determination as to whether or 
not interstate commerce was involved, because if it was, de-
fendant's conduct would not have been improper. Those 
questions are not before the court at this time, however, be-
cause we are considering an appeal from an order denying 
a preliminary injunction. Moreover, inasmuch as the is-
sue of whether interstate commerce is involved is a mixed 
factual and legal question, it would be more appropriate to 
determine this issue on the trial of the action rather than 
on the bare allegations in the pleadings. 
The order is reversed and the cause is remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings as may be proper, giving 
consideration to the 1952 change in the law. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
